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THE "LEGALIZATION" OF THE
FAMILY: TOWARD A POLICY OF
SUPPORTIVE NEUTRALITYt
David L. Chambers*
I. THE EXTENT OF GOVERNMENT INTRUSION TODAY
A. Less is More
The word "legalization" has conflicting meanings. One, in-
tended to sound the theme of this conference, conveys the no-
tion of government regulation permeating some area of human
activity. The other-as found, for example, in the phrase "the
legalization of marijuana"-is a near opposite: the process of
making legal or permissible that which. was previously forbidden,
taking government out of that which it had previously con-
trolled. The recent history of government's relationship to the
family amply displays both sorts of legalization, both govern-
ment's intrusion and its withdrawal, and reveals a paradoxical
relation between the two-that as government frees people to
live their family lives as they choose, people feel no more free, in
part because much government involvement is required to facili-
tate the new freedom.
That American governments have in many respects reduced
their intrusion on individual decisions about family matters is
apparent on a moment's reflection. Today, for example, in the
United States nearly three million men and women of all social
classes regard themselves as "couples" and live together outside
of marriage-a number that has more than doubled since 1970
and quadrupled since 1960. During this period, many states have
t This paper, in an earlier version, was delivered at a Conference on "The
Legalization of American Society" held in Ann Arbor at the dedication of the new wing
of the library at the University of Michigan Law School in October 1981. In revising it
into an article in 1984, I tried to retain the flavor of a speech that I prepared when a
group of conservative Members of Congress were advocating a set of policies directed at
families that I considered especially repressive and that a large number of Americans
seemed to support. Not a great deal has changed in four years.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., 1962, Princeton University; LL.B.,
1965, Harvard University.
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repealed their statutes barring fornication. Within the last cen-
tury, few people have been prosecuted under such laws, but
some have been threatened and others have been fired from
public employment. An even more remarkable change in recent
years is that homosexual partners who want to live together as
family are equally free to do so, at least in most large cit-
ies-free to hold their heads high, free of fear of criminal prose-
cution. Over twenty states have now removed criminal sanctions
from voluntary homosexual relations. Homosexual couples, it is
true, may not marry. They are also far less free of discrimination
in relation to public employment than are unmarried heterosex-
ual couples. The law is nonetheless more tolerant today than it
was.
1
Even the married couple is freer today than in the past-freer
to purchase contraceptives, the distribution of which was once
severely hampered by state and federal laws, freer to obtain an
abortion of an unwanted pregnancy. For the married couple,
perhaps the most important freedom of all has become the free-
dom to decide not to be a family any more-the freedom, that
is, to divorce.2 A hundred and fifty years ago, some American
states barred divorce altogether or made it available only by spe-
cial legislative bill. Of course, many couples broke apart without
divorcing, but neither partner could legally remarry nor, in some
states, obtain the state's assistance in dividing property. By the
late 19th century, divorce was permissible but obtainable, at
least as a matter of statutory law, only if one partner could
prove that the other had committed some sort of serious marital
misconduct. If both parties had sinned, no divorce would be
granted. The state, not the couple, determined the moral code
by which the conduct of the partners would be judged. Today,
by contrast, all states have adopted fault-free divorce. Any two
people who want to end a marriage can do so, at least after a
waiting period.
With all this freedom, I do not claim that people are happier
than in the past, but I think it undeniable that they are
freer-freer under law to live with whomever they please, to
1. For a careful tracing of changes in the laws affecting homosexual persons, see Ri-
vera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1981) and
its exhaustive predecessor, Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
2. The history of the movement toward a no-fault divorce in this country and in
Western Europe is traced by M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW
(1972). The Family Law Reporter provides an annual monitor of the state of divorce law
in the United States. For the most recent version, see FLR's 1983 Survey of American
Family Law, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3017 (1984).
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conduct the relationship as they please, and to leave the rela-
tionship when they please. Of course, it is not law alone or even
law primarily that determines whether most people start or
cease to live together as family. But laws do make a difference to
some people and some laws-such as the recent laws liberalizing
divorce-seem to have affected the behavior of many people.
If the law permits so much greater freedom, why do many
people have a sense that they are less free than in the past and
that government today intrudes more, not less, into their lives?
In part, the sense of greater intrusion is the paradoxical effect of
the new freedom, for in our society laws are not simply a way of
controlling undesired conduct. They also facilitate people's free-
dom of choice. Let me give a couple of examples. Most of you
have heard of the case of Marvin v. Marvin.3 The actor, Lee
Marvin, was sued in California by Michelle Triola, the woman
with whom he had lived for several years outside of marriage.
She claimed that they had an explicit agreement and certain im-
plicit understandings regarding her support. If Ms. Triola had
filed her lawsuit in California a number of years earlier or in
some states today, she would have been denied relief on the
ground that her relationship with Lee was illicit or immoral. In
1976, however, in the Marvin case, California's Supreme Court
held that its courts would enforce agreements between unmar-
ried cohabitants.
Some would cite Marvin as an example of the pervasive tin-
kering by government through its courts in people's family lives,
but in an important sense, California's court was seeking just the
opposite-to permit people to use agreements to shape their
lives in whatever ways they see fit and to be taken seriously
when they have done so. When corporate executives complain
today that they are over-regulated by the government, they cer-
tainly do not include among their complaints court enforcement
of contracts between corporations. While I have many misgiv-
ings about Marvin, about which I will say more later, it illus-
trates well how freedom and government intertwine.
In much the same way, the refusal of states in the past to per-
mit divorce greatly limited people's freedom to live life as they
chose. Yet ironically the vastly expanded freedom to divorce
produces much more involvement of courts in people's lives.
Each year, thousands of Americans who have never been in a
court before have their first taste in the depressing process of
breaking up. And government's involvement in these couples'
3. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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lives typically continues for years after divorce. Week by week,
for up to eighteen years in cases in which there are children, one
parent will be ordered to make payments of child support, the
other to permit the noncustodial parent to visit. This court-su-
pervised period of the parents' lives will last, for the typical di-
vorcing couple in the United States, nearly twice as long as their
marriage itself had lasted. One day a few years ago I suggested
the possibility of a change in the law to a colleague who is often
critical of government intervention in general. I suggested that, a
few years after divorce, courts cease enforcing both support and
visitation and leave the couple to work matters out for them-
selves without the aid of the state. He was appalled at the idea
that a divorced parent might be left with no legally enforceable
right to visit his children. Most others would be equally appalled
at leaving the children and their custodial parent without an en-
forceable entitlement to support. So much for ending govern-
ment regulation of families.
Congress too has enacted much legislation intended to facili-
tate free choice about family arrangements or at least to amelio-
rate the effects of the freedom that people are in fact exercising
about family matters. It has, for example, amended the Social
Security Act to respond to the problems of the divorced spouse
who has not made payments into the Social Security fund, but
was married for many years to a wage-earner.4 It has altered the
income tax laws to respond to the child-care costs of the increas-
ing number of single-parent families and the increasing number
of two-parent families in which the mother is working outside
the home, even though working mothers depart from the tradi-
tion of the mother as full-time child-tender.5 Many other exam-
ples could be given of the increase in the law's involvement in
the family to respond in a positive way to the varieties of family
life that people choose for themselves, or wish to leave.
To be sure, government's greater involvement in families can-
not be explained entirely as the consequence of people's greater
freedom to live their lives as they choose. The federal govern-
ment's greater involvement in family matters over the last fifty
4. For the most recent applicable provisions, see sections 131 and 132 of the Social
Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 92 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
402(b), 402(e)(4) (West 1983)). Sections 301 through 309 of same amendments elimi-
nated a large number of gender-based distinctions in the Act. In these enactments, Con-
gress is, to be sure, imposing its own view of fairness on divorcing couples (compare
discussion of equitable distribution laws in text infra at notes 18-20).
5. For its most recent form, see section 504(a)(1) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1563 (codified at I.R.C. § 44A (1982)).
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years has grown in at least equal measure out of its increasing
role as ensurer of all Americans' financial security and out of its
response to other social ills such as discrimination on the basis
of race and sex and inequalities in educational opportunity. This
increased involvement has been achieved by both a vast increase
in revenue raising through taxes and a vast increase in expendi-
tures on need-based programs, such as AFDC and Medicaid, and
on social insurance programs, such as Social Security. Many of
these enactments necessarily involve Congress in considering the
various arrangements in which people live-who, for example,
should be recognized as the dependents of whom?-and many
have forced Congress to confront controversial issues of family
policy. Congress was paralyzed repeatedly during the 1970's by
the issue of abortion because it had created Medicaid, a broad
program of medical care for low-income citizens, and was forced
to decide whether abortions would be a covered service.
An additional source of the sense of government infiltration
into family life may derive, ironically, from changes in law not
directed at families at all but rather directed at businesses or at
government itself. Consider, for example, the many recent laws
and court decisions relating to discrimination on the basis of sex.
In some respects, such laws affect families fairly directly. Laws
that mandate equal opportunities for education and jobs and
equal compensation for equal work may contribute to the break-
down of traditional family relationships by making it more ap-
pealing for women to take a job outside the home. Such laws
may have subtler effects as well. None of them directly orders
husbands to treat their wives as equals. Yet these laws, together
with the language of liberation that has accompanied them, may
well be perceived as imparting a judgment by government about
the appropriate relationship of men and women in their private
and not merely their public lives. At home the old-fashioned
husband who has believed that his dominance was God's will
blames the government for tampering with his prerogatives. Law
follows and then reinforces social attitudes even toward family
matters that it does not directly regulate.
Whatever the source of the perception that government is in-
volved more in the lives of families, one measure of the univer-
sality of the perception is the degree to which people today hold
government responsible for solving family problems. Newspapers
and television newscasters complain about bureaucracy and yet,
often, when a child is beaten to death by her mother, focus their
story not on the mother but on the social welfare department
worker who had decided not to remove the child from home.
SUMMER 1985]
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The inadequacies of young adults are the fault, not just of par-
ents, but of our public schools. The United States Civil Rights
Commission blames the child-care problems of the working
mother on the failure of government to provide adequate day-
care services. And in a society as large and complex as ours,
many problems perceived as serious do require government's in-
volvement. The challenge is to define the appropriate lines be-
tween government involvement and private responsibility.
B. The Goals of Lawmakers Today: Deregulation or
Reregulation?
The purpose of this paper is not simply to measure how far
government has intruded into people's lives, but to try to define
how far it ought to intrude.
Behind this conference on "legalization" lies a sense that law
has seeped into every crevice of American life and that sensible
people ought to be asking whether we have gone too far. Large
numbers of Americans who voted for Ronald Reagan, especially
at the time of his first election, believe that government is too
meddlesome and that the family is among the institutions of
American life that government has harmed by its programs.
This sense of intrusion inspired a remarkable and instructive
piece of legislation proposed by Republican Senators Roger Jep-
sen of Iowa and Paul Laxalt of Nevada. They entitled their bill
the Family Protection Act of 1981.8 The bill died without receiv-
ing hearings, but it generated considerable attention at its intro-
duction. Examination of its terms is useful because they reveal a
distinctive view of the appropriate relationship of government
and family.
In introducing his bill, Senator Jepsen spoke forlornly: "[As] a
father of six children," he said, "and a grandfather, I have great
concern over the rise of Government intervention in the family."
He looked back with nostalgia on a world that had been lost, on
a world in which the federal government played no role.
[W]hen I attended school, in a one-room country
schoolhouse on a corner of our family land, each day be-
gan with [a] pledge of allegiance outside to the flag, re-
gardless of what the weather was, cold or hot. We went
6. Family Protection Act of 1981, S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S6329
(1981).
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inside, hung up [our] clothes, put our boots in a nice neat
row if it was wet weather, went and stood beside our
desks, and recited the Lord's Prayer together, sat down
and went to work. I am very thankful for that school,
that training, that discipline.
Today, the school life of Senator Jepsen's grandchildren prob-
ably is very different. In place of the Pledge of Allegiance and a
morning prayer, they receive an introduction to Darwinian
evolution and a dose of sex education that their parents view as
enticing young people toward sin. When they reach high school,
they are offered contraceptive devices that enable them to sin
without punishment on earth. I agree with Senator Jep-
sen-these sorts of activities by government intrude into mat-
ters many people feel should be left up to families. It is no less
intrusive simply because I personally am not bothered by the
idea that my children will hear about natural selection or the
pill from their grade school teacher.
So far I am sympathetic to Senator Jepsen's complaint. Where
he and I part company is the cure. If viewed honestly, what Sen-
ators Jepsen and Laxalt wanted was to replace the Democrats'
form of governmental intrusion with their own. What govern-
ments need to do, Senator Laxalt claimed in introducing their
bill, is "to reemphasize the traditional values that made this a
great nation" and "return to the old ways that worked so well."
What made this nation great, in his view, was the two-parent,
patriarchal family with mother at home taking care of the chil-
dren. And the bill he and Senator Jepsen introduced sought to
restore that family to its imagined former greatness.
Their bill had several dozen sections. Here are a couple of ex-
amples. One section would have barred the use of federal funds
to purchase or prepare any educational materials that "tend to
denigrate, diminish, or deny the role of the differences between
the sexes as it has been historically understood in the United
States." Under this provision, the government would be permit-
ted to underwrite the preparation of materials that advocate
separate roles for men and women within society or within fami-
lies, but would not be permitted to underwrite materials with an
opposing point of view. Another section would have barred at-
torneys working in any legal-aid program supported by the Le-
gal Services Corporation from helping clients obtain divorces.
Today, in many states, obtaining a divorce without the assis-
7. 127 CONG. REC. S6329 (1981).
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tance of an attorney is for all practical purposes impossible, and
only through programs underwritten by the Legal Services Cor-
poration are poor persons able to obtain attorneys. The Family
Protection Act effectively would have revived indissoluble mar-
riage for the poor.
I read that bill and felt as sad as Senator Jepsen did before he
drafted it. The old-fashioned family has felt oppressed, but its
champions want more than to set it free. They want to become
the oppressor. Do unto others what they have done unto you.
The Reagan Administration came into office in 1981 sounding
the theme of deregulation but, as to laws affecting the family,
his most ardent supporters in Congress sought reregulation, not
deregulation.
To be sure, the Family Protection Act died, but the Adminis-
tration's supporters have enjoyed some minor legislative suc-
cesses. In June 1984, for example, Congress enacted a bill to
support enriched curricula for "magnet" schools in communities
undertaking desegregation plans. The act included a little-no-
ticed section, drafted by Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, that pro-
hibits using any of the act's funds "for any activity which does
not augment academic improvement or for courses of instruction
the substance of which is secular humanism."8 The act does not
define "secular humanism." To many conservatives, however,
that term captures, in a single phrase, all that they consider ob-
jectionable in the beliefs of feminists, gay activists, and liberals.
For them it would probably include teaching materials that
"denigrate the role of the differences between the sexes as it has
been historically understood."
Similarly, in September 1981, the House of Representatives,
for the first time since the adoption of home rule for the District
of Columbia, rejected a measure passed by the District of Co-
lumbia City Council that did not plainly intrude on federal in-
terests.9 It did so by a vote of 281 to 119. What was the momen-
tous local legislation that the House went out of its way to
reject? It was a revision of the District of Columbia criminal
code that would have repealed old laws that forbid voluntary ho-
mosexual acts and all forms of heterosexual intercourse except
vaginal intercourse by a married couple. Because of the action of
the House, married couples in the District of Columbia still
commit a felony whenever they engage in oral sexual acts. In
8. Education for Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, § 709, 98 Stat. 1267,
1301 (1984) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 4059 (West Supp. 1985)).
9. H.R. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H6745 (1981).
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urging his colleagues to reject the action of the City Council,
Representative Daniel Crane of Illinois proclaimed: "We have
lost sight of the moral codes. The time has come for God-fearing
people to stand up and be counted."10
Most of the rest of this essay is devoted to my own view of
what the regulation and deregulation of the family might look
like in the late twentieth century. I recommend a general posi-
tion, illustrate it, confront its limitations, and try to defend it. I
have a somewhat different point of view than that of Senator
Laxalt, Senator Jepsen, or Representative Crane.
II. REGULATION, DEREGULATION, AND "SUPPORTIVE NEUTRALITY"
In my scheme of things, legislatures would largely get out of
the business of deciding which adults can live with each other
inside or outside of marriage. They would repeal laws that bar
voluntary unmarried heterosexual or homosexual relationships.
Indeed, so long as legislatures make marriage sanctioned by the
state available to heterosexual couples, they would make it avail-
able to homosexual couples as well. Legislatures would also re-
peal laws that prohibit polygamy. Government should never bar
a couple or group from living together simply because it believes
the relationship immoral, asymmetric, or confusing.
Government would also intrude less on ongoing families. The
House of Representatives would ratify the District of Columbia
City Council's repeal of its old laws regulating the ways married
couples (or other freely choosing adults) can enjoy sex with each
other. State governments would change their laws that permit
removing a child from a home merely on a finding that a home is
"unfit" or that a child does not receive "proper guidance." Local
governments would repeal zoning laws that prohibit unrelated
people from living together in certain residential areas.
Finally, government would intrude less on adult decisions
about leaving family groups that they have entered. It would re-
move long waiting periods before divorces could be granted. It
would reduce the opportunity for state-conceived views of fault
to be taken into account in property division or child custody.
The state of Michigan, for example, would repeal that part of its
child-custody statute that requires courts to take into account
10. 127 CONG. REC. H6733-34 (1981).
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the "moral fitness" of each parent, without any showing that the
parent's conduct is likely to harm the child.11
The guiding principle for government would be that it would
not directly prohibit or coerce (or make adverse decisions based
on judgments about) any form of family conduct, unless it could
point to specific and substantial secular harms caused by the
conduct. What harms would count as substantial would neces-
sarily vary over time as the society's values change-preventing
mental anguish and preserving historic sites are seen as more
important today than they were a hundred years ago-but the
harms that count must be limited to those felt by real people
while they are on earth. Two additional requirements should be
demanded of any particular proposed regulation: first, the values
that can accrue from ameliorating the harm must be weighed, in
some rough way, against the costs to individuals of intruding on
their private lives and, second, alternative regulations that in-
trude less on family decisions must be used whenever they can
be as effective or nearly as effective. Thus, government can ap-
propriately be concerned about the harms to children that typi-
cally occur when parents divorce, but should seek methods to
ameliorate the harms without prohibiting divorce altogether, or
even imposing three-year waiting periods before a divorce can
become final. Even with as serious a problem as spousal assault,
governments should seek ways to protect a victim who requests
it while preserving her opportunity to continue her relationship
with the other person if she wishes it. Honoring such desires, the
state would permit victims to "drop" criminal charges even if
permitting them to do so might reduce the deterrent effects of
an aggressive policy of prosecution.
In taking this narrow view about appropriate government in-
trusion on private conduct, I do not mean that you and I should
regard lightly our decisions to enter into or to leave relationships
or take lightly the moral dimensions of our conduct within rela-
tionships. We should live up to the callings of our own religious
beliefs and personal values. At the same time, we should resist
the majority or a passionate minority using government to tell
all of us how we must live as families, unless the government can
point to harms other than harms to our souls and can show that
intrusion is likely to do more good than harm.
Apart from these narrow sorts of circumstances justifying di-
rect intervention, government ought to practice "supportive neu-
trality"-a fancy label, an oxymoron, but, I hope, a helpful way
11. MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 722.23, 722.25, 722.27 (1979).
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to convey a rather straightforward idea. Government, in this
view, should be supportive of individual choices regarding family
arrangements and styles of living, but strive to be neutral among
individuals making different choices.
Frances Olsen, elsewhere in this Symposium, claims that,
within the American system of laws, arguments for government
neutrality toward the family are incoherent and misleading. 2 In
an important sense she is correct. My view of neutrality does
build upon certain non-neutral premises regarding the role of
the state-most particularly, the state as supporter of both a
system of private ownership of goods and resources and a system
of parental control over the children who live with them. None-
theless, in a society that widely accepts these premises, my no-
tion of neutrality, though dubious as a matter of formal logic, is
useful as a state of mind for public decision makers when con-
fronting issues of policy.'3
For example, legislatures must often, in the course of raising
revenues, make decisions about appropriate taxing units in a
context in which any decisions they make create incentives for
people to choose one living arrangement over another. Con-
gress's recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, that
render more nearly equal the positions of married couples filing
joint returns and unmarried couples filing individual returns, ad-
mirably exemplifies in its effects if not its motive, the posture
that I call "supportive neutrality." The tax laws now leave peo-
12. See Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
835 (1985).
13. My views about neutrality would be unacceptable to many feminist scholars. See,
e.g., C. HEILBRUN, REINVENTING WOMANHOOD (1979); Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2
J.L. & INEQUALITY 1 (1984). They would applaud the repeal of many old laws pertaining
to the family because many imposed and sustained a system of male domination over
women. On the other hand, they would argue that adopting today a position of govern-
mental neutrality about family-law matters simply leaves women at the mercy of the
economic domination men retain. While ambivalent about or rejecting laws that would
openly protect women as a disadvantaged class, they might argue that government
should, for example, be affirmatively involved in instilling in public schools a view of the
family in which women are equal in all respects to men. They would believe that any
other position for women entails harms to women (and children) that government ought
to seek to prevent. With discomfort, I disagree. I do not believe that old forms of family
life-of men outside the home and women as full-time childbearers and home-tenders-
leads in itself so frequently to harm that government is justified in seeking to dismantle
it. It is true that physical violence by men toward women seems more likely to occur in
units in which women are isolated in the home and economically dependent. It is also
true that divorce typically leaves women in much worse financial positions than men.
Nonetheless, it is also the case that large numbers of women find satisfaction in the lives
they lead in traditional units. Many believe it fulfills their duties to God. I do not believe
that we know enough about the keys to human satisfaction to justify affirmative govern-
ment calls for one scheme of family organization over another.
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ple to select their marital status with fewer governmental pres-
sures to make one choice over another. 14
Why is my view of the appropriate relation of state to family
preferable to Senator Jepsen's? In some ways, my call for gov-
ernmental neutrality would appear extraordinarily easy to de-
fend. In a slightly different form, it has been defended many
times by people more able than I, 15 but in the present political
climate it bears repeating.
As a starting point, our nation has a long, if erratic, commit-
ment to individual liberty. If you do not accord some substantial
value to individual autonomy, and you may not, you will have
little sympathy for anything else I have to say. 6 Our system of
government contemplates a general freedom of individuals to
live their lives as they please, so long as they do not cause unjus-
tifiable harms to others. In substantial measure, the functions of
government are to protect the freedom of individuals and to pro-
vide opportunities for individuals to lead full lives as they define
them.
To be sure, my vision of the role of government-liberal as
opposed to libertarian-also assumes that government ought in
some ways constrain the freedom of individuals well beyond
prohibitions of certain forms of harms. Governments should tax
us all (and thus curtail our freedom to spend as we wish) to un-
derwrite the expenses of public schools, public assistance, and
other welfare programs intended to permit all individuals to at-
tain some measure of freedom and independence.
Where stands the family in this vision? Throughout our na-
tion's history, politicians have sung the praises of individual lib-
erty and yet adopted and retained many laws intended to limit
or regulate individuals' choices about family matters. Is the fam-
ily to be regarded as an entity that government ought to regulate
widely for the general nurturance and protection of the individ-
ual and advancement of the state? Or should it be seen as an
extension of the individual that government ought generally to
leave alone? If, like many on the American right, when you con-
template individual decisions about family matters, you think
14. I.R.C. § 1 (West 1984) (tax rate tables).
15. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) and the response of P.
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
16. In recent years, American critics on the left have described Western liberal
thought as empty or incoherent. Yet at the core of liberal thought, as even its critics
concede, lies "a liberating accomplishment of our culture: the affirmation of free human
subjectivity against the constraint of group life . Kennedy, Critical Labor Law
Theory: A Comment, 4 INDus. REL. L.J. 503, 506 (1981).
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first of temptations toward carnal sin and the disintegration of
the traditional family, you will probably favor substantial regu-
lation of one sort. If, like many on the American left, when you
contemplate individual decisions about family matters, you
think first of abuses of power by parents toward children and by
men toward women, you will probably favor substantial regula-
tion of a different sort.
I worry about the disintegration of the two-parent family and
about the physical and economic abuse of women. But the domi-
nant image in my mind when I contemplate the family is differ-
ent from either of these and has shaped my general distrust of
regulation. My guiding image when I contemplate individual de-
cisions about family matters is more positive. It is of the family
as the vehicle through which individuals satisfy many of their
basic needs and wants-for sustenance and physical protection
as well as for acceptance and understanding, for intimacy and
affection. The family creates its own universe with its own rules
that are not necessarily the same rules needed to guide behavior
between strangers. The family also forms the vehicle through
which each of us transmits his most fundamental values to the
next generation in a culture in which it is acceptable for people
to hold a variety of values. In my view, the family should not be
seen as a tool of the state. It should be seen as a buffer from the
state, a refuge, a sanctuary. It is with good cause that our Con-
stitution demands that the state have a sound reason and a war-
rant before entering our homes.
When governments bar individuals from living with persons
they choose, or bar individuals from ceasing to live with persons
they wish they hadn't chosen, governments inhibit dramatically
people's opportunities to experience the satisfactions of family
life in ways that are comfortable to them. Remember Senator
Jepsen's one-room classroom. There in the back row sat little
Emily already feeling a little out of place. Emily grew up want-
ing to share her life and her body with another woman. Whose
interest is greater? Emily's in living in a manner comfortable to
her? Or her classmates in vindicating their moral code by limit-
ing Emily's freedom? The same question must be asked of the
desire of heterosexual couples to express their love for each
other in something other than the missionary position, and of
the desire of couples to free themselves from an unhappy
marriage.
Of course, the cases of Emily and the unmarried heterosexual
couple are the easy cases-the conduct of wholly consenting
partners that has little effect on outsiders. The harder cases in-
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volve family members who view themselves as victims of another
family member's conduct and family conduct that affects the
lives of people outside the family. As to each sort, there are
often valid, indeed compelling, reasons for government regula-
tion, but that regulation should be shaped with a recognition of
the values to individuals and couples of being permitted to regu-
late their own lives.
III. THE ATTRACTIONS AND DIFFICULTIES OF "NEUTRALITY"
A. Where Neutrality is Unattainable: Abortion and Teenage
Sexuality
Governments find many contexts where a goal of neutrality
toward family matters can serve as a useful starting point for
shaping policy. Yet governments that seek to remain neutral to-
ward most family matters will nonetheless find that it is impos-
sible to remain neutral about some matters, and that for others
neutrality, though possible and appealing, is elusive.
Abortion is surely the issue above all others for which
lawmakers, however much some might wish, cannot construct a
neutral stand. It remains the most persistent family issue on
Congress's calendar, arising year after year in the context of fed-
eral limits on state reimbursement for Medicaid costs and,
within the last few years, in the context of ardent efforts to over-
turn the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade17 by a consti-
tutional amendment. While at first glance, neutrality might
seem to dictate simply removing penalties for abortion and leav-
ing decisions about abortion to the pregnant woman, the re-
moval of penalties is a non-neutral decision by government
about who counts as a human being. Compare infanticide. A de-
cision by a state to decriminalize the killing of newborns by par-
ents would surely be seen by most Americans as a gross failure
of the state to fulfill its duty to protect human life, rather than
as an admirable act of restraint permitting parents to control
the size of their family. So long as government generally protects
lives considered "human," it cannot avoid confronting decisions
about what in fact is human. I personally favor leaving the
choice about abortion to the pregnant woman, but my reasoning
cannot rest alone on a preference for government neutrality.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Another issue that the Reagan administration addressed dur-
ing its first term poses a similar quandary-the issue of whether
parents should be informed that their child has received contra-
ceptive devices distributed at government expense. For govern-
ment to distribute contraceptives while informing the teenager's
parents intrudes on what many would consider to be the "right"
of the young person to make private choices about sexual mat-
ters. On the other hand, to distribute contraceptives without in-
forming the parents effectively interferes with the parents' op-
portunity to guide their minor child regarding a
matter-premarital sex-that many parents consider at the
heart of their responsibilities. When government makes birth
control devices, sexual education, or abortions, available through
any program, government cannot escape defining an age at
which a person becomes entitled to make decisions for herself.
B. Where Neutrality is Possible But Elusive: The
Distribution of Property When Married and Unmarried
Couples Separate
The attractions and limits of a policy of "supportive neutral-
ity" can be better illustrated through a less inflammatory issue
of public policy than abortion or teenage sexuality. Let us con-
sider the role of government in the division of property when
married and unmarried couples separate. Here, neutrality is elu-
sive, but it can at least serve as a helpful guide.
Nearly all American states except the community property
states once had statutory or common-law rules that required
courts upon divorce to distribute property solely by reference to
which party held title at the point of separation. Today, nearly
all these states have "equitable distribution" schemes.1 8 These
provide no precise formula, but rather direct the court to make a
distribution after considering a variety of factors, including the
length of the marriage, the parties' capacities for self-support,
and the parties' contribution to the development of the property
(including contributions through homemaking). In most of these
states, but not all, courts may not consider moral fault in mak-
ing the distribution.
Like most commentators, I applaud the move away from the
old title system. On the other hand, I have some doubts about
its replacement.
18. For a list of state laws and the details of these laws, see Fried, Equitable Distri-
bution As of December 1982, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4001 (1983).
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Under the current system, judges decide what they believe, in
accordance with general community values, to be the equitable
division of property between the parties. The judge decides what
value to attach to a long marriage or to the housework done by
one spouse; the judge determines how to weigh the limited earn-
ing potential of one of the parties. Such judgments violate my
views about governmental neutrality.
If it were possible, I would prefer a system in which the court
would apply the couples' own values, including their own con-
cepts of moral fault, in dividing the property. Unfortunately,
what I prefer is not workable in the real world. Many couples
have never shared a set of values or expectations that could
guide the court and even when they have, divining those shared
expectations will typically be impossible for a court in a heated
hearing after separation. A more feasible alternative, more con-
sistent with a principle of neutrality than the equitable distribu-
tion statute, would be for legislators to adopt a fixed rule of dis-
tribution that most closely reflects the aspirations and values of
the largest numbers of their citizens, and to augment this rule
with an express authorization to couples to contract for a differ-
ent distribution. I would guess that more people entering mar-
riage in the United States today would espouse the notion of
marriage as a partnership of assets than any other single notion.
The newly proposed Uniform Marital Property Act reflects the
partnership ideal, providing that couples own in equal shares all
property acquired after marriage.19 The right to contract for dif-
ferent outcomes, however, would honor those with a different
view of their relationship. 0
The problems that arise when an unmarried couple separates
often differ very little, although legislatures and courts have re-
garded them in a wholly different manner. Let me give some
19. See UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT prefatory note (1983).
20. There are, of course, problems with such a rule. One is that many couples who
share views about their financial relationship other than those embodied in community
property notions will fail to memorialize them in a contract. A second problem is that, in
some cases, a person who does enter into a contract will find, years later, that the con-
tract no longer seems fair. (Consider, for example, the young woman who agrees before
marriage that she and her spouse-to-be will maintain separate property but later finds,
to her surprise, that she has become the full-time caretaker of children.) A third prob-
lem, of a different order, is that, even with the escape clause, a statute establishing com-
munity property notions as the general rule will probably affect some peoples' views
about justness and fairness and retard the evolution of new views about financial respon-
sibility and distribution; the government, though wishing to be neutral, will reinforce
normative standards.
I do not have full answers to these problems.
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background. In 1977, the Georgia Supreme Court dealt with a
dispute between Hazel Rehak and Archie Mathis, a couple who
had lived together outside of marriage for eighteen years' Hazel
claimed that shortly after they began to live together, they
bought a house and took title in Archie's name. For the next two
years, she made all the mortgage payments out of her earnings.
For the sixteen years thereafter, she contributed half the pay-
ments. When their relationship ended, Hazel came to court. She
claimed an explicit agreement that the house belonged to them
jointly and that Archie would take care of her for the rest of his
life. In the briefest of opinions, the justices of the Georgia court
held that she was entitled to no relief because she was seeking
enforcement of an agreement growing out of a "meretricious" re-
lationship, an agreement resting on "immoral consideration."
The court treated her the same way it would have treated a
prostitute suing a customer who had refused to pay. Until re-
cently, most American courts would have responded in much the
same way. Senators Laxalt and Jepsen would approve this
result.
A few months before the Georgia ruling, however, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reached a strikingly different result in Mar-
vin v. Marvin.22 Lee Marvin, an actor, and Michelle Triola, a
singer, lived together for six years but never married. After they
broke up, Michelle sued Lee for a share of the assets that had
accumulated in his name during the relationship, as well as for
periodic payments comparable to alimony. She claimed that Lee
had expressly promised to provide for her forever in exchange
for her agreement to abandon her career and become a
homemaker.
In reviewing the case, the California Supreme Court did not
hold, as many people believe, that unmarried persons who sepa-
rate after a long relationship are entitled to something called
"palimony." Nor did the court hold that the state's community
property statute binds unmarried couples. What the court held
was that courts will enforce express and implied contracts be-
tween unmarried partners and apply other equitable remedies to
carry out the partners' expectations.2 3 The court rejected old
cases that denied relief when an agreement grew out of a rela-
tionship considered immoral.
21. Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977). For a similar decision, see
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
22. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
23. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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In the introduction, I applauded Marvin, despite the fact that
it can be viewed as an example of government poking its nose
into family relationships it had previously left largely alone. The
court's involvement seems creditable because the justices agreed
to honor the terms of a relationship that Michelle and Lee had
hammered out for themselves. Without government involve-
ment, a person like Michelle could be left with empty promises.
With government involvement, a person like Michelle who is not
accumulating property in her own name can agree to live with
someone outside of marriage, sharing assets in some way, and
live a little easier day-by-day knowing that a court will honor
the agreement.
The Marvin decision has been widely praised by many com-
mentators, including, for example, Professor Herma Hill Kay,24
on much the same grounds as I would praise it. I nonetheless
harbor some misgivings about Marvin. I fear that in the end it
may produce much mischief along with some sound results. Let
me explain why my applause for Marvin is merely the sound of
one hand clapping.
My doubts begin with one of the more attractive aspects of
the court's opinion. The California justices in Marvin were not
merely indifferent to relationships between unmarried people.
They tried to be supportive. They referred to "the prevalence of
nonmarital relationships in modern society and the social ac-
ceptance of them."2 5 They even stated with seeming approbation
"that many young couples live together without the solemniza-
tion of marriage in order to make sure they can successfully later
undertake marriage. 2 6 Marvin can thus be read as welcoming
unmarried cohabitors to the community of decent citizens.
Yet is the justices' gracious gesture simply the welcome of the
spider to the fly? Lee and Michelle, like thousands of other un-
married people, consciously decided to live outside the law, at
least outside the law of marriage. The justices may have believed
that they were simply making the courts available to these
thousands to enforce their own private agreements, but much in
the opinion and in the nature of these cases indicates to me that
the court was actually laying the foundation for imposing our
laws and rules on the outlaws.
24. Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937
(1977) (also expressing reservations).
25. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
26. Id.
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Marvin poses the danger that, when unmarried people split,
judges will violate my principle of neutrality by imposing their
own view of justice, even though they ostensibly will be merely
enforcing the parties' agreements. The reason lies in the nature
of the agreements in these cases. Most businesses that end up in
contract disputes have written agreements. While their contract
terms may be ambiguous, they are at least there for all to read.
When unmarried couples separate, they will sometimes, but
probably infrequently, have committed their understandings to
paper. Michelle did not claim that she and Lee had done so. She
claimed instead an oral contract as well as an "implied contract"
that could be inferred from the parties' conduct. The California
Supreme Court held that express oral contracts and implied
contracts were enforceable. Here the problem begins.
Under traditional contract theory, to be enforced as "con-
tracts," agreements must reflect some sort of "meeting of the
minds" between two parties. A difficult notion at best even in
the context of written commercial agreements, the "meeting of
the minds" is even more elusive when applied to understandings
within family relationships. In the common situation, one part-
ner, more often than not a woman, will claim that she and the
other partner had an oral agreement. Her partner will give the
same words a different meaning or deny that they were said at
all. She will introduce evidence-joint checking accounts, divi-
sions of functions within the home-that both supports her
claim of an agreement and supports an inference of an implicit
understanding between them. He will point to other con-
duct-her employment history, separate savings accounts-that
he claims indicates that they had no understanding or a differ-
ent understanding. The judge will have grave difficulty deciding
who is telling the truth about past statements, interpreting what
the parties meant in the statements they did make, or knowing
what to infer from the couple's conduct. While the judge may be
able to determine with some confidence the couple's understand-
ing of who would support whom day-by-day at various times
during the relationship, she is less likely to be able to determine
whether they had an understanding about the issue at trial: the
division of assets or continuing support if they broke up.2 7 The
danger for a principle of neutrality is that the judge will decide
that the couple agreed to do that which the judge believes they
27. In Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980),
the New York Court of Appeals held, largely on this ground, that its courts would en-
force express contracts but not implied contracts between unmarried persons.
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ought to have agreed to do.
The court's opinion in Marvin recognized the difficulties for
courts in determining whether an unmarried couple had reached
an understanding about assets and post-separation support. If
the court had wanted to assure that judges not impose their own
morality or some view of majoritarian morality, it might have
warned courts that most claims alleging contracts would have to
be dismissed. Instead, however, it took a long step in the oppo-
site direction and revealed what I believe to be the court's un-
conscious desire to domesticate these unmarried people. It di-
rected courts facing ambiguous facts to "presume" that "the
parties intend to deal fairly with each other." 8 Judges were in-
vited to find that parties had agreed to whatever the judge de-
cides is "fair" between them in the absence of contrary evidence
that one or both intended to act "unfairly." In deciding what is
"fair," judges are highly likely to be guided by their own views
of the parties' conduct-what one party could "fairly" expect of
the other if he failed to keep a clean house or was sexually pro-
miscuous or earned vastly more than the other or became physi-
cally incapacitated. In the Marvin case itself, for example, the
trial judge on remand decided that fairness required that Lee
pay Michelle $104,000 to help her get back on her feet, even
though he also found that Lee and Michelle had no understand-
ing whatever about post-separation support, and even though
Michelle had led a luxurious life with Lee and was left no worse
off than she began.2 9 Although the trial judge was reversed on
appeal, 0 other trial courts in other cases are likely to issue com-
parable orders.
Marvin may thus have furnished the parchment for a govern-
mentally imposed charter of "fairness" for unmarried couples.
The charter may look different from the charter for married
people but it may reflect as inexactly the actual understandings
or expectations of many unmarried persons who find themselves
bound by it. For governments eager to control individual behav-
ior, the lesson of Marvin may be the one preached by some law-
enforcement people who favor removing criminal sanctions for
the sale of marijuana: government can better control an activity
if it legalizes it, regulates it, and taxes it than if it bans it en-
tirely. But the ultimate question is whether government ought
28. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (1979).
29. 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3077 (1979), rev'd, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555
(1981).
30. 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
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to regulate the conduct. The problem in my view is that more
than one outcome can typically be defended as "fair" in these
cases, even by persons sensitive to the unequal economic posi-
tion of women in our society.
The Marvin case also illustrates another danger of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's beneficent motives. In cases involving
couples without a written contract, the parties will need to use
evidence of their life circumstances to bolster their claims or de-
nials of an agreement. In the Marvin case itself, the trial court's
inquiry into Lee and Michelle's relationship spread over 8,000.
pages of transcript. Michelle related Lee's whisperings across the
pillows in bed and sweet nothings written in letters. She ex-
plained that she had cooked a roast beef for him and his friends.
"Yes, a roast," she said staring Lee in the eye across the court-
room. Lee in turn put on several witnesses who testified that
Michelle had so little talent as a singer that she had had no ca-
reer to give up. He also claimed that they had never had a tradi-
tional marriage-like relationship. He alleged, for example, that
while he was on location for a film in Micronesia, Michelle, who
had accompanied him, began an affair with a Peace Corps volun-
teer. Michelle responded on rebuttal that the allegation was a lie
and, besides, the Peace Corps volunteer was a homosexual. The
embarrassed volunteer came to court and offered witnesses of
his own to prove that he was a heterosexual. By the end, every
sordid detail of their recent lives and the lives of some of their
friends had been shared with the public.
Of course, most cases of unmarried partners will involve far
less newsworthy parties, but even without spectators in the
courtroom, trials of this sort are likely to poison for each party
the memories of nearly every aspect of their relationship, as they
recast past conversations and events to fit their theory of the
dispute. That seems a heavy price to pay for public recognition
of the worthiness of unmarried relationships. Indeed, a deep
irony exists here: in the service of progress, California has cre-
ated for unmarried couples the opportunity for the tawdry pa-
rades of infidelity and abuse that most states, including Califor-
nia, tried to remove from the divorcing process for married
couples by repealing fault-based divorce laws.
These then are my fears about Marvin: that government has
opened its arms to embrace the wayward and will end up suffo-
cating them in the process; that despite my hopes, it is very dif-
ficult for government to be both "supportive" and "neutral" at
the same time.
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In my view, the California court would have been wiser to
have fashioned a less expansive rule. It should have announced
that, in cases of disputes between unmarried partners who are
separating, courts are to honor express agreements if, but only
if, they are in writing and that courts are neither to recognize
implied contracts nor to create new equitable remedies. I regret
that such a rule would prevent courts from giving relief to per-
sons who make serious oral agreements and rely on them, and to
persons, usually women, who have no formal agreement but who
work for many years raising children, accumulate no assets in
their own name, and come to regard themselves as in the same
position as a married person. Despite this, a rule limiting judi-
cial relief to written agreements would have the virtue of cur-
tailing greatly courts' opportunities to reframe the terms of pri-
vate relationships and would reduce the number of acrimonious
family disputes aired in public. We must remember that in re-
fusing to enforce oral agreements, government would not be
prohibiting couples from honoring their own commitments. Even
in Georgia today, many unmarried couples who separate no
doubt behave honorably within the terms of their own relation-
ship, despite the fact that neither can secure any judicial relief.
For all my fears and my tone of alarm, Marvin may well prove
far less pernicious in day-to-day operation than I forecast. Only
a few appellate cases have been reported in which trial judges
have accepted the Marvin invitation to impose a "just" result,31
although we cannot know how many unappealed trial court
judgments there have been in which a judge has done so. The
healthy side of Marvin may be that for every unmarried couple
upon whom a judge. imposes her own views of decency, there will
be several other couples who reach settlements without having
gone to trial at all. In many of these cases, Marvin will simply
have triggered a process of negotiation leading to a division of
property that seems reasonable to the couple and that vindicates
mutual expectations to a greater degree than had been the case
before Marvin was decided. If this does turn out to be Marvin's
effect, then many of my objections end, and the worthy stated
purpose of the California court-taking seriously people's shap-
ings of their own relationships-will have been realized.
What Marvin illustrates, I believe, is that none of us is trust-
31. See the trial court opinion in Marvin on remand, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3077
(1979), rev'd, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981); Taylor v. Polackwich, 145
Cal. App. 3d 1014, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1983). Cf. Nelson v. Nevel, 154 Cal. App. 3d 132, 201
Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984).
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worthy when we act as judges of the family lives of others. All of
us need to recognize our desires to control the behavior of
others. We need to urge restraint, in both our legislatures and
our courts, on the whole range of settings in which government
regulates families.
CONCLUSION
Let me end with an analogy. As a way of thinking about the
appropriate relation of the state to the family, recall the delicate
course our nation has fixed for itself in the relationship between
church and state. We have striven for a form of neutrality in
which government neither "establishes" a state religion, nor
stands in the way of people's "free exercise" of their own reli-
gions. The state indeed acts appropriately when it fosters oppor-
tunity for individuals to engage in the religion of their choice.
Exempting church property from taxation helps people to main-
tain places where they can worship. Even though such exemp-
tions may increase the taxes paid by those of us with other reli-
gious beliefs or no religious beliefs, nothing the government has
done in providing the exemptions pressures individuals to par-
ticipate in any given religion or in any religion at all. So with the
family, the state should not impose a single view of permissible
family forms or permissible family behavior, nor stand in the
way of people's choices about family forms in which they wish to
live. Indeed, the state can appropriately aid them in easing the
burdens of the choices they make-through deductions, for ex-
ample, for the costs of day care-when it perceives that a form
of family life or family activity cannot prosper without support.
Being supportive while being neutral has never proven an easy
mission in the context of questions about church and state.
When the state uses tax dollars to provide bus service to chil-
dren in parochial schools, some regard government as engaging
in the "establishment" of religion, while others see government
as merely promoting its "free exercise." Moreover, the analogy
of the relation of family and state to the relation of church and
state is not a perfect one, for the state appropriately can be
more enthusiastic about families in general than it can be about
religion in general. Nonetheless, in the context of questions
about the family, remembering the issues of church and state
can help us recall the delicate balances that need to be struck.
At the moment it seems to me that legislators like Senator
Laxalt and Senator Jepsen and Representative Crane do not ap-
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preciate the desirability of this balance. Representative Crane
advised us that we should stand up and be counted for the
Moral Codes. I have some advice for him and for his colleagues
in Congress and state legislatures. The time has come to sit
down, be quiet, and let people find the forms of family life that
they-not we-believe desirable.
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